Kenneth
Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Building
capacity and limiting corruption at all levels of Afghan governance are crucial
to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan
security leadership. The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure
has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001.
However, nepotism and political considerations in hiring are entrenched in
Afghan culture and other forms of corruption are widespread. Afghan President
Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption
institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai
backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. At a donors’
conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s
economy through at least 2017, provided Afghanistan takes concrete,
verifiable action to rein in corruption. On July 26, 2012, Karzai appeared
to try to meet his pledges to the Tokyo conference by issuing a “decree on
administrative reforms”—a document of sweeping policy directives intended to
curb corruption. Partly because of corruption in the Afghan security
forces, on August 4, 2012, the National Assembly voted to remove the
ministers of interior and of defense.
Afghan and U.S. critics of President Hamid Karzai’s government assert that he
has concentrated authority in Kabul through vast powers of appointment at
all levels—appointment power given him by the Afghan constitution. Karzai
has publicly denied assertions by opposing faction leaders that he wants
to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, but he is said
to be trying to identify and then support an acceptable successor.
International efforts to curb fraud in two successive elections (for
president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) largely failed and many believe
election oversight has improved little since, although civil society groups are
trying to ensure robust competition and electoral fairness.
There is concern among many observers that the above governance weaknesses will
cause Afghanistan to founder as the United States and its partners wind
down their involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Some argue that
the informal power structure, which has always been at least as
significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure, will sustain governance
beyond 2014 if formal governing structures falter. However, that outcome might invite
even more corruption and arbitrary administration of justice than is the case
now as major factions’ leaders gain power. Karzai has failed to
marginalize these ethnic faction leaders, in part because they have large
constituencies, but he relies more closely on the loyalty of several close, ethnic
Pashtun allies, particularly those from the Qandahar area. The non-Pashtun
faction leaders generally oppose Karzai’s willingness to make concessions
to insurgent leaders in search of a settlement. There are fears that a
reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics will further set back
progress in human rights and the rights of women and boost Pashtun power.
Broader issues of human rights often vary depending on the security environment
in particular regions, although some trends prevail nationwide. Women,
media professionals, and civil society groups have made substantial gains
since the fall of the Taliban, but traditional attitudes contribute to the
judicial and political system’s continued toleration of child marriages, imprisonment
of women who flee domestic violence, judgments against converts from Islam to Christianity,
and curbs on the sale of alcohol and Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media.
See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40747, United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues,
by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.
Date of Report: August 15, 2012
Number of Pages: 67
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