Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, began a political crisis that has defied resolution. The crisis since 2011 has been more intense than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain and demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by reform efforts instituted during 1999-2010 or since the uprising began. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but many in the Sunni minority government of the Al Khalifa family believe the Shiites want outright rule.

In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the crisis. The government asserts it has already implemented most of the BICI recommendations— an assertion corroborated by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation and a “follow-up committee.” However, the upholding of prison sentences for prominent dissidents and government refusal to agree to more substantial political reforms, have stoked continued demonstrations. Adding to the deadlock is that neighboring Saudi Arabia, which has significant political and economic influence over the Bahraini government, is backing hardline Al Khalifa officials that oppose compromise. Some fear that the unrest could evolve into violent insurgency, a concern increased by the discovery of bombs and other weaponry in 2012.

The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime. It has criticized the regime’s use of force and the upholding of long prison sentences for leading dissidents, urged the government to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow governmentopposition differences. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime to containing Iranian power—an objective the United States and Bahrain share. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. Beyond that facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.


Date of Report: October 5, 2012
Number of Pages: 39
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the Jordanian regime (particularly in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other countries in the region), the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the possibility of U.S.-Jordanian nuclear energy cooperation, and U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2012 amounted to approximately $13.1 billion. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid funding. On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. The President’s FY2013 request includes $360 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $300 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $3.7 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET).


Date of Report: October 3, 2012
Number of Pages: 22
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

Iran’s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifugebased uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.

Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of May 2012, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to five percent uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically produce enough HEU for several nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing up to 20 percent uranium-235, but, as of May 2012, this amount was not sufficient to yield a sufficient amount of weapons-grade HEU for a weapon.

Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran’s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges.

Tehran has also continued work on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium—the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran’s nuclear facilities and has been able to verify that Tehran’s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. But the agency still has concerns about the program, particularly evidence that Iran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. The United States has assessed that Tehran has the technical capability eventually to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear.

Whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program is also unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran “halted its nuclear weapons program” in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is “keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons” and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is “inherently reversible.” U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. For example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in January 2012 that Iran “is keeping open the option to develop” nuclear weapons.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 that Iran would probably need “about a year” to produce a nuclear weapon and “possibly another one to two years” to incorporate it into a delivery vehicle. However, Director Clapper indicated in February 2012 that it would likely take Iran longer than a year to produce a nuclear weapon after making a decision to do so. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.


Date of Report: September 26, 2012
Number of Pages: 54
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Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance

Curt Tarnoff
Specialist in Foreign Affairs

The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist forces in the region. Since 2001, nearly $83 billion has been appropriated toward this effort.

Since FY2002, nearly two-thirds of U.S. assistance—roughly 62%—has gone to the training and equipping of Afghan forces. The remainder has gone to development and humanitarian-related activities from infrastructure to private sector support, governance and democratization efforts, and counter-narcotics programs.

Key U.S. agencies providing aid are the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of State.

On December 23, 2011, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 (H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74) was signed into law. The State, Foreign Operations appropriations did not specify account levels for Afghanistan, but from available amounts, the Administration allocated $1.8 billion in Economic Support Fund (ESF), $324 million in International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and $64.8 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, and Demining (NADR) funds. The Defense appropriations provided $11.2 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), $400 million for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. The Administration has allocated about $258 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations.

In February 2012, the Administration issued its FY2013 budget request, seeking a total of $2.5 billion in total ESF, INCLE, NADR, and IMET, compared with the $2.3 billion allocated in the previous year. It also requested $5.7 billion for the ASFF, $400 million for CERP, $400 million for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and $179 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations.

This report provides a “big picture” overview of the U.S. aid program and congressional action. It describes what various aid agencies report they are doing in Afghanistan. It does not address the effectiveness of their programs. It will be updated as events warrant.

For discussion of the Afghan political, security, and economic situation, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. For greater detail on security assistance provided by the Department of Defense, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale.


Date of Report: August 21, 2012
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The Obama Administration and several of its partner countries are seeking to reduce U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan while continuing to build Afghan governing and security capacity to defend the country by the end of 2014. To secure longer term U.S. gains, on May 1, 2012, President Obama signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that will likely keep some (perhaps 15,000—20,000) U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 as advisors and trainers. Until then, the United States and its partners will continue to transfer overall security responsibility to Afghan security forces, with Afghan forces to assume the lead nationwide by mid-2013. As lead responsibility shifts, the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to the “pre-surge” level of 68,000 as of September 20, 2012. President Obama has said that “reductions will continue at a steady pace” from then until the completion of the transition to Afghan lead at the end of 2014. However, the transition process has been hampered somewhat by a pattern of attacks by Afghan forces on their coalition mentors and trainers. In keeping with the Strategic Partnership Agreement, on July 7, 2012 (one day in advance of a major donors’ conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo) the United States named Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” further assuring Afghanistan of longterm U.S. support.

The Administration view is that, no matter the U.S. and allied drawdown schedule, Afghan stability after the 2014 transition is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for 2014, will be free and fair. Afghan anti-corruption institutions have been established since 2008 but, thus far, have lacked effectiveness.

There is also increased U.S. and Afghan emphasis on negotiating a settlement to the conflict. That process has proceeded sporadically since early 2010, and has not, by all accounts, advanced to a discussion of specific proposals to settle the conflict. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups worry about a potential settlement, fearing it might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.

To promote long-term growth and prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement in Afghanistan, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resources. Several major privately funded mining, agricultural, and even energy development programs have begun or are beginning. U.S. officials also see greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns—referred to as the “New Silk Road (NSR).” Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.

Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2011, the United States has provided over $67 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $39 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2011, the Afghan intervention has cost about $443 billion, including all costs. For FY2012, about $15 billion in aid (including train and equip) is to be provided, in addition to about $90 billion for U.S. military operations there, and $9.7 billion in aid is requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, U.S. economic aid requests are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017, according to the Administration. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: September 21, 2012
Number of Pages: 93
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