Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Ten years after the March 19, 2003 U.S. military intervention to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, increasingly violent sectarian divisions are undermining the fragile stability left in place after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Sunni Arab Muslims, who resent Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination, are escalating their political opposition to the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki through demonstrations as well as violence. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on separate disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has been leaning to the Sunnis and Kurds, and could hold the key to Maliki’s political survival. Adding to the schisms is the physical incapacity of President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who has served as a key mediator but who suffered a stroke in mid-December 2012 and remains outside Iraq. The rifts impinged on provincial elections on April 20, 2013 and could affect national elections for a new parliament and government scheduled for in 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.

The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) as well as groups linked to the former regime of Saddam Hussein. These groups, emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria, are conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members with increasing frequency and lethality. The attacks appear intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict and provoke the fall of the government. As violence escalates, there are concerns whether the 700,000 person ISF can counter it without U.S. troops to provide direct support.

U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and military control and arguing that the ISF could handle violence on its own. Since the U.S. pullout, many observers and some in Congress have asserted that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed significantly—squandering the legacy of U.S. combat deaths and funds spent on the intervention. Program components of what were to be enduring, close security relations—U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation— Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program—have languished in part because Iraqi officials perceive the programs as indicators of residual U.S. tutelage. The U.S. civilian presence in Iraq has declined from about 17,000 to about 10,500 and is expected to fall to 5,500 by the end of 2013.

Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the Administration and Congress seek to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran, with which the Maliki government has built close relations. Apparently fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki has joined Iran in opposing U.S. and other country calls for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to leave office. However, the legacy of Iran-Iraq hostilities, and Arab and Persian differences, limit Iranian influence among the Iraqi population. Another limitation on Iranian influence is Iraq’s effort to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012, and has substantially repaired relations with Kuwait, the state that Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied in 1990.


Date of Report: June 3, 2013
Number of Pages: 53
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a

broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s advancing nuclear program. Well

before the nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran, the United States had

seen Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to

undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of actively helping Syria’s

leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try

to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is

peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did

explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a

level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Further

high-level talks took place on February 26-27, 2013, and April 5-6, 2013, both in Almaty,

Kazakhstan. No breakthroughs were achieved in Almaty. Iran’s Supreme Leader has not taken up

U.S. offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are required to produce

a breakthrough. And, there is an emerging consensus that international sanctions—although

severely harming Iran’s economy—have not pressured the regime to the point at which it is

compelled to compromise.

The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s

nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the point where Iran could produce a nuclear

weapon relatively quickly. President Obama Administration says the option of U.S. military

action against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open, but he has asserted that there is still time—

although increasingly limited—for diplomacy. He reiterated this position during his March 2013

visit to Israel.

Some experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part because of Iran’s

growing international isolation and in part because of its repression, although not to the point

where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The domestic opposition remains relatively weak

and outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the political

dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and the major candidates in the presidential

election to be held on June 14, 2013, are Khamene’i loyalists. Two major figures considered a

potential threat to the ruling establishment, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s close

aide and protégé, were barred from running by the ruling clerics.

The 112th Congress supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with

enactment of the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws

expand sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and precious

metals transactions with Iran. Additional Iran sanctions bills, such as H.R. 850, are in varying

stages of consideration in the 113th Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871,

Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program:

Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

Date of Report: May 28, 2013
Number of Pages: 78
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Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has secured chemical weapons, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.

Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed three alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. None have been confirmed by U.S. officials. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate.

According to letters sent April 25, 2013, to Senators John McCain and Carl Levin by Miguel Rodriguez, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, the U.S. intelligence community “does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin.” The Obama Administration has emphasized that the evidence is not definitive, however, and that additional investigation is needed.

President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could possibly mean the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.


Date of Report: May 31, 2013
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Iran Sanctions

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Increasingly strict sanctions on Iran—which target primarily Iran’s key energy sector as well as its ability to access the international financial system—have harmed Iran’s economy, but not to the point where key Iran leaders have been compelled to reach a compromise with the international community on Iran’s nuclear program. And, the strategic effects of sanctions might be abating as Iran adjusts to them economically and advertises the adverse humanitarian effects.

• Oil exports fund nearly half of Iran’s government expenditures, and Iran’s oil exports have declined to about 1.25 million barrels—a halving from the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. The causes of the drop have been a European Union embargo on purchases of Iranian crude oil that took full effect on July 1, 2012, and decisions by several other Iranian oil customers to substantially reduce purchases of Iranian oil. To date, 20 of Iran’s oil customers have reduced Iranian oil imports sufficiently to achieve an exemption from U.S. sanctions under the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).

• The loss of revenues from oil, coupled with the cut-off of Iran from the international banking system, has caused a collapse in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial. That collapse has increased inflation to over 50%, according to many experts. Iran’s economy shrank slightly from 2012-2013 and will likely shrink again during 2013. There have also been unintended consequences including a shortage of some advanced Western-made medicines.

• However, Iran has found ways to mitigate the economic and political effects of sanctions. Government-linked entities are creating front companies and making increased use of barter trade. Iranian traders are using informal banking exchange mechanisms and, benefitting from the fall in the value of Iran’s currency, sharply increasing non-oil exports such as agricultural goods, minerals, and industrial goods. Affluent Iranians are investing in hard assets such as real estate.

Although sanctions have not compelled Iran to change its position on its nuclear program, sanctions may be slowing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs by hampering Iran’s ability to obtain needed technology from foreign sources. However, Department of Defense and other assessments indicate that sanctions have not stopped Iran from developing some new weaponry indigenously. Iran is also judged not complying with U.N. requirements that it halt any weapons shipments outside its borders, particularly by providing arms to the embattled Assad government in Syria. And, sanctions do not appear to have altered Iran’s repression of dissent or its efforts to monitor public use of the Internet.

Some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase. In the 112th Congress, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) made sanctionable the shipping of Iranian crude oil, and it enhanced human rights-related provisions of previous Iran-related laws. A provision of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) sanctions transactions with several key sectors of Iran’s economy. A bill in the 113th Congress, H.R. 850, ordered to be reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 22, 2013, would authorize, but not mandate, U.S. sanctions against nearly all trade with Iran and it would sanction banks that exchange Iran’s hard currency abroad. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: May 31, 2013
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