Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response

Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria has entered its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. U.S. officials and many analysts believe that Asad and his supporters will ultimately be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Opposition forces are formidable, but forces loyal to President Bashar al Asad continue to resist, using air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing counterattacks. U.S. officials believe that the capacity of government forces is eroding but also believe that fighting would likely continue even if opposition groups achieve their objective of toppling Asad. Some members of the Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms. Many observers worry that a further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, or lead to wider civil or regional conflict.

Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to government and opposition forces, the fighting has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some estimates suggest more than 70,000 Syrians have been killed since unrest began in March 2011. As of April 22, more than 1,380,406 refugees had fled the country, more than 1.1 million of them since September 2012. According to the United Nations, as many as 3.6 million Syrians may be internally displaced. United Nations appeals for $1.5 billion for Syrians through June 2013 remain mostly underfunded, with U.N officials warning of a potential collapse of their ability to support the growing number of those displaced and in need. The United States has provided $409 million in humanitarian assistance to date.

President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August 2011, and have pressed the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Syrian government. The United States has recognized the National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces (SOC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and is providing nonlethal assistance to the Coalition and an affiliated Supreme Military Command Council (SMC). The Obama Administration believes that a negotiated political settlement is required and has prepared military plans to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, if necessary.

Members of Congress and Obama Administration officials are weighing these issues as they continue to debate U.S. policy. Some observers advocate for more robust nonlethal and lethal aid to the SOC and SMC as a means of forcing the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents of this approach argue that making opposition groups more formidable could intensify the fighting and risks empowering extremists. Meanwhile, Asad refuses to step down and warns his supporters that “victory is the only option.” Some armed opposition factions, including powerful Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation outright and prefer a military solution to the conflict.

After two years of unrest and violence, the central question for policy makers remains how best to bring the conflict in Syria to a close before the crisis consigns the region to one of several destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The human toll of the fighting, and the resulting political, ethnic, and sectarian polarization, all but guarantee that political, security, humanitarian, and economic challenges will outlast Asad and keep Syria on the U.S. agenda for years to come.


Date of Report: April 22, 2013
Number of Pages: 51
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel

Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past aid programs, data on annual assistance, and an analysis of current issues. For general information on Israel, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $118 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received significant economic assistance. Strong congressional support for Israel has resulted in Israel receiving benefits not available to any other countries; for example, Israel can use some U.S. military assistance both for research and development in the United States and for military purchases from Israeli manufacturers. In addition, U.S. assistance earmarked for Israel is generally delivered in the first 30 days of the fiscal year, while most other recipients normally receive aid in installments. In addition to receiving U.S. State Departmentadministered foreign assistance, Israel also receives funds from annual defense appropriations bills for rocket and missile defense programs. Israel pursues some of those programs jointly with the United States.

In 2007, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a 10-year, $30 billion military aid package spanning from Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to Fiscal Year 2018. During his March 2013 visit to Israel, President Obama pledged that the United States would continue to provide Israel with multi-year commitments of military aid subject to the approval of Congress. P.L. 113- 6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (informally referred to as the full-year Continuing Resolution or CR) provides the full FY2013 Administration request for Israel of $3.1 billion in FMF, of which Israel is permitted $815.3 million in Off-Shore Procurement. The Act also provides for $479.736 million in joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs, including $211 million for Iron Dome, $149.679 million for David’s Sling, $74.692 million for Arrow III, and $44.365 million for Arrow II.

For FY2014, the Administration is requesting $3.1 billion in FMF to Israel and $15 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance. The Missile Defense Agency’s FY2014 request for Israeli Cooperative Programs is $95.782 million, including $52.607 million for Arrow III, $32.512 million for David’s Sling, and $10.663 million for Arrow II. The Department of Defense also is requesting $220 million in FY2014 Procurement, Defense-wide funds for Iron Dome.

Recent legislation on U.S. foreign assistance to Israel proposed in the 113th Congress includes:

• H.R. 938 (S. 462), the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013—a bill that would, among other things, exempt Israel from regulations that require it to obtain U.S. permission to sell some American-controlled technology to third countries. The bill also would extend the authorization of U.S.-Israeli energy cooperation, among other things. 
• H.R. 1130, the Iron Dome Support Act— a bill that would authorize the procurement of the Iron Dome anti-rocket defense system.

Date of Report: April 11, 2013
Number of Pages: 34
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide during the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, was reduced to a “pre-surge” level of about 68,000 as of September 20, 2012. An additional 34,000 will leave by February 2014, but the bulk of that drawdown will take place in late 2013- early 2014. The size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is to be announced in mid-2013, but options center on about 8,000-12,000 U.S. forces, plus about half as many partner forces. U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. They will train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) but some will engage in counter-terrorism combat as well. Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.

The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 5, 2014, will be devoid of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but informal discussions have continued and some talks have evolved into exchanges of specific proposals. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.

The United States and other donors continue to implement various infrastructure projects— particularly those for water, power, and roads. To prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement, U.S. officials hope that Afghanistan will be able to exploit vast mineral and agricultural resources, as well as its potentially significant hydrocarbon resources. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.

Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2012, the Afghan intervention has cost about $557 billion, including all costs. About $9.7 billion in economic aid and $82 billion in additional U.S. military costs are requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: April 9, 2013
Number of Pages: 91
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the Jordanian regime (particularly in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other countries in the region), the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the civil war in neighboring Syria, and U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries.

The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2012 amounted to approximately $13.1 billion. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid funding. On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. The President’s FY2013 request includes $360 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), $300 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $3.7 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET).

During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama pledged to work with Congress to deliver an additional $200 million in direct budget support to Jordan to help it cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 included a provision authorizing U.S. loan guarantees for Jordan. Section 1706 (j) also appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the cost of sovereign loan guarantees, which are expected to enable Jordan to raise several hundred million dollars on the international bond market. Recent U.S. humanitarian aid for Syria ($385 million total) includes funds to be spent inside Jordan on Syrian refugees. To date, $57 million in Syrian humanitarian aid has been spent in Jordan, including $25 million from a recent U.S. pledge of $155 million at a Kuwait Donors’ Conference. Funds spent in Jordan are for supplies and services for refugee camps there. In addition, USAID funding is helping northern Jordanian communities address water shortages as a result of the influx of Syrian refugees by upgrading and repairing water delivery networks and encouraging conservation.


Date of Report: April 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 20
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s advancing uranium enrichment program. Well before the Iran nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns in 2003, the United States had long seen Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there and of trying to block resolution of the unrest in Bahrain, a key U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Further discussions on that potential agreement took place on February 26-27, 2013, and March 18, 2013, with high level talks to re-convene on April 5-6. However, no breakthrough is expected in advance of Iran’s June 2013 presidential elections. Iran’s Supreme Leader has, to date, refused to engage in direct bilateral talks with the United States that many experts believe would be required to produce a breakthrough. And, there is an emerging consensus that international sanctions— although severely harming Iran’s economy—have not pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to compromise.

The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the point where Iran could produce a nuclear weapon relatively quickly. President Obama Administration asserts that there is still time— although increasingly limited—for diplomacy before U.S. military action is considered; he reiterated that stance during his March 2013 official visit to Israel.

Many experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part because of Iran’s growing international isolation and in part because of its repression, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The domestic opposition remains relatively weak and outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the political dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and it is likely that the favorite in the presidential election, to be held on June 14, 2013, will be a Khamene’i loyalist. Still, the regime is likely to allow some moderate reform-minded figures to run in order to try to avoid the mass public unrest that occurred in the aftermath of the presidential election in 2009.

The 112th Congress supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905, P.L. 112-158), and a title of the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws expand sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and precious metals transactions with Iran. Additional bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.


Date of Report: April 4, 2013
Number of Pages: 83
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