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Friday, August 30, 2013

Egypt in Crisis: Issues for Congress



Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

This report provides a brief overview of the key issues for Congress related to Egypt. U.S. policy makers are now grappling with complex questions about the future of U.S.-Egypt relations, particularly in light of the growing unrest and violence currently unfolding. These debates are shaping consideration of appropriations and authorization legislation and congressional oversight options in the 113th Congress.

To date, the Obama Administration has “strongly condemned” the ongoing violence in Egypt, has focused on urging all parties to resolve the conflict peacefully, and has denounced the imposition of martial law. President Obama also has canceled a joint U.S.-Egyptian military exercise planned for September referred to as Bright Star, a multinational training exercise co-hosted by the United States and Egypt annually since 1981. On August 18, the Administration announced that it had put a hold on future financing for programs funded by annual $250 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). On July 24, the Administration notified Egypt that it had halted the delivery of four F-16 fighter aircraft to Egypt acquired by Egypt under a 2010 purchase contract for 20 F-16 C/D fighters. According to various media sources, the Administration also may be considering delaying shipments of Apache attack helicopters and repair kits for tanks.

For additional background on Egypt, please see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.


Date of Report: August 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R43183
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Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Nearly two years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, increasingly violent sectarian divisions are undermining the fragile stability left in place. Sunni Arab Muslims, who resent Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination, have escalated their political opposition to the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki through demonstrations and violence. Iraq’s Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts impinged on provincial elections during April—June 2013 and could affect the viability of national elections for a new parliament and government expected in March 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.

The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) as well as groups linked to the former regime of Saddam Hussein. These groups, emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria as well as perceived discrimination against Sunni Iraqis, are conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members, and Sunni supporters of Maliki with increasing frequency and lethality. The attacks appear intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict and provoke the fall of the government. To date, the 800,000 person ISF has countered the escalating violence without outside assistance and Iraqi forces have not substantially fractured along sectarian lines. However, a July 2013 major prison break near Baghdad cast doubt on the ISF ability to counter the violence longer term.

U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and military control. Some outside experts and some in Congress have asserted that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed significantly since, tarnishing the legacy of U.S. combat deaths and funds spent on the intervention. Program components of what were to be enduring, close security relations—extensive U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program—have languished or are ending in part because Iraqi officials perceive the programs as indicators of residual U.S. tutelage. The U.S. civilian presence in Iraq has declined from about 17,000 to about 10,500 and is expected to fall to 5,500 by the end of 2013. Still, Iraqi efforts to acquire sophisticated U.S. equipment such as F-16 combat aircraft, air defense equipment, and attack helicopters gives the Administration some leverage over Baghdad.

Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the Administration and Congress seek to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran, with which the Maliki government has built close relations. However, the legacy of the 1908-88 Iran-Iraq war, Arab and Persian differences, Iraq’s efforts to reestablish its place in the Arab world, and Maliki’s need to work with senior Iraqi Sunnis limit, Iranian influence over the Baghdad government. Still, fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki has not joined U.S. and other Arab state calls for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to leave office and Iraq has not consistently sought to prevent Iranian overflights of arms deliveries to Syria. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012, and has substantially repaired relations with Kuwait, the state that Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied in 1990. In June 2013, the relationship with Kuwait helped Iraq emerge from some Saddam-era restrictions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.



Date of Report: August 22, 2013
Number of Pages: 50
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability after U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but it remains weak and rampant with corruption. Even as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai has concentrated substantial authority through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai is constitutionally term-limited, but some Afghan leaders are concerned that he might not hold the presidential and provincial elections scheduled for April 5, 2014, or that he might use state election machinery to support a chosen successor. Fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) was extensively documented, but Afghan officials, scrutinized by opposition ties, civil society organizations, and key donor countries, have taken some steps to improve election oversight for the April 2014 elections.

Fears about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing widespread nepotism and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of support from senior Afghan government leaders who oppose prosecuting their political allies. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, on the condition that Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. Afghan progress on that issue was assessed relatively unfavorably at the end of a Tokyo process review meeting in Kabul attended by major donors on July 3, 2013.

No matter how the Afghan leadership succession process works out, there is concern among many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners reduce their involvement in Afghanistan. Several leaders of an informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure—have begun to plan for the 2014 end of the international security mission. Many Afghans look to these faction leaders, rather than to the government, to protect them from possible civil conflict with the Taliban after 2014. But, an increase in the influence of faction leaders could produce even more corruption, arbitrary administration of justice, and human rights abuses than has been the case since the international intervention in 2001.

President Karzai is appealing to nationalist sentiment to attract Taliban support to rejoin Afghan politics, but Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that a full reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics could reverse some of the human and women’s rights gains since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islam and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.



Date of Report: August 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 64
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The UAE’s relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as human trafficking, and opportunity for UAE-based Iranian businesses to try to circumvent international sanctions. The social and economic freedoms have not translated into significant political change; the UAE government remains under the control of a small circle of leaders who allow citizen participation primarily through traditional methods of consensus-building. To date, these mechanisms, economic wealth, and reverence for established leaders have enabled the UAE to avoid wide-scale popular unrest. Since 2006, the government has increased formal popular participation in governance through a public selection process for half the membership of its consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). But, particularly since the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, there has been an increase in domestic criticism of the unchallenged power and privileges of the UAE ruling elite as well as the spending of large amounts of funds on elaborate projects that cater to tourists. The leadership has resisted any dramatic or rapid further opening of the political process, and it is becoming increasingly aggressive in preventing the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamist, as well as secular opposition movements. The crackdown is drawing increased criticism from human rights groups.

On foreign policy issues, the UAE—as has Qatar—has become increasingly assertive in recent years, using its the UAE’s ample financial resources and its drive to promote regional stability. The UAE has ordered the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States, making the UAE pivotal to U.S. efforts to assemble a regional missile defense network directed primarily to counter Iran’s expanding missile force. It also has joined the United States and U.S. allies in implementing significant financial and economic sanctions against Iran. The UAE has deployed about 250 troops to Afghanistan since 2003 and pledges to keep some forces there after the existing international security mission there ends in 2014. In 2011, it sent 500 police to help the beleaguered government of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state Bahrain; UAE pilots flew combat missions against Muammar Qadhafi of Libya; and it joined the GCC diplomatic effort that brokered a political solution to the unrest in Yemen. The UAE is financially backing armed rebels in Syria. It gives large amounts of international aid, for example for relief efforts in Somalia, and the UAE is giving substantial aid to the transitional government of Egypt that followed the military ousting of President Mohammad Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader.

For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there were initial concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program, particularly for the potential leakage for U.S. and other advanced technologies to leak illicitly to Iran. These concerns were underscored by dissatisfaction among some Members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, submitted to Congress that day, and entered into force on December 17, 2009. The concerns have since been largely alleviated by the UAE’s development of strict controls, capable management, and cooperation with international oversight of its nuclear program.



Date of Report: August 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
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Friday, August 23, 2013

Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress



Mary Beth D. Nikitin 
Specialist in Nonproliferation 

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation 

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces


The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.

Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed several alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria by both the government and opposition forces. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate. On June 13, 2013, the White House released a statement saying that following its investigation, “our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information.” The June 13 statement said that chemical weapons use had resulted in an estimated 100-150 deaths in Syria.

President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations. The June 13 White House statement said that in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President has authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.


Date of Report: July 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 22
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