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Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide in the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20, 2012. President Obama announced that 34,000 of the contingent will leave by February 2014. The size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is under discussion between the United States, its allies, and the Afghan government, and reportedly center on about 8,000-12,000 U.S. forces, plus about 4,000 partner forces. U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.- Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. The forces would reportedly engage in counter-terrorism missions as well as train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.

The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe haven in Pakistan. Among other efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, will not experience the fraud of the elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but informal discussions have continued and, by the end of 2012, began to evolve into exchanges of specific proposals. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.

The United States and other donors are in the process of completing various infrastructure projects—particularly those for water, power, and roads. To prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement, U.S. officials also hope to draw on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural resource, as well as its small but unexplored and potentially significant hydrocarbon resources. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghanistan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.

Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. During FY2001-FY2012, the Afghan intervention has cost about $557 billion, including all costs. About $9.7 billion in economic aid and $82 billion in additional U.S. military costs are requested for FY2013. As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.



Date of Report: March 8, 2013
Number of Pages: 92
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Monday, March 11, 2013

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to address the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s advancing uranium enrichment program. Well before the Iran nuclear issue rose to the fore in 2003, the United States had long seen Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of trying to block resolution of the unrest in Bahrain, a key U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Subsequent technical talks produced no immediate progress, but resulted in a resumption of talks on February 26-27, 2013. However, the talks produced little evident progress, and Iran’s Supreme Leader has rejected a U.S. offer of direct bilateral talks with Iran—considered key to a breakthrough.

The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities unless the United States provides assurances that it will act, militarily if necessary, if diplomacy fails to prevent Iran from taking final steps toward developing a nuclear weapon. The Administration asserts that there is still time—although increasingly limited—for diplomacy before U.S. military action is considered. But, there is a growing realization that the accumulated international sanctions—including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union that went into full effect on July 1, 2012—has not pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to compromise.

Many outside experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part because of Iran’s growing international isolation and in part because of its repression, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. However, the domestic opposition remains relatively weak and outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the political dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and it is likely that the significant candidates in the next presidential election, to be held on June 14, 2013, will be Khamene’i loyalists. However, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is constitutionally barred from running again, continues to challenge supporters of Khamene’i. The regime is trying to ensure that the 2013 election does not produce the mass public unrest that occurred in the aftermath of that election in 2009 over perceptions of election fraud.

The 112
th Congress supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905, P.L. 112-158), and a title of the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws expand sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and precious metals transactions with Iran. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. .


Date of Report: February 28, 2013
Number of Pages: 84
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Thursday, March 7, 2013

Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights



Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Accelerating violence and growing political schisms call into question whether the fragile stability left in place in Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will collapse. Iraq’s stability is increasingly threatened by a revolt—with both peaceful and violent aspects—by Sunni Arab Muslims who resent Shiite political domination. Sunni Arabs, always fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would seek unchallenged power, accuse him of attempting to marginalize them politically by arresting or attempting to remove key Sunni leaders. Sunni demonstrations have grown since late December 2012 and some have led to protester deaths. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on their own disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has been leaning to the Sunnis and Kurds and could hold the key to Maliki’s political survival. Adding to the schisms is the physical incapacity of President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who has served as a key mediator, who suffered a stroke in mid-December 2012. The growing rifts will likely affect provincial elections in April 2013 and national elections for a new parliament and government in 2014.

The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by Sunni insurgents linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), apparently emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria. They are conducting increasingly frequent attacks against Shiite religious pilgrims and neighborhoods and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members. The attacks are intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict, and might succeed in that objective if violence worsens. There are concerns whether the ISF—which numbers nearly 700,000 members— can counter the violence now that U.S. troops are no longer in Iraq; U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The Iraqis refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, believing Iraq could handle violence on its own and seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. occupation and political and military tutelage.

Since the U.S. pullout, U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program have languished. However, the Administration—with increasing Iraqi concurrence—has asserted that the escalating violence necessitates that Iraq rededicate itself to military cooperation with and assistance from the United States. Since August 2012, Iraqi officials have requested expedited delivery of U.S. arms and joint exercises and in December 2012 signed a new defense cooperation agreement with the United States.

Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the United States is seeking to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran. The Maliki government has built close relations with the Islamic Republic, and, fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Sunni opposition, Maliki has joined Iran in supporting Bashar Al Assad’s regime. However, the legacy of Iran-Iraq hostilities, and Arab and Persian differences, limit Iranian influence among the Iraqi population. Another limitation on Iranian influence is Iraq’s effort to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012.



Date of Report: February 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 58
Order Number: RS21968
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Friday, March 1, 2013

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations



Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

This report provides a brief overview of the key issues for Congress related to Egypt and information on U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. U.S. policy makers have routinely justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and on sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Egypt’s government as generally influencing developments in the Middle East in line with U.S. interests. U.S. policy makers are now grappling with complex questions about the future of U.S.-Egypt relations, and these debates and events in Egypt are shaping consideration of appropriations and authorization legislation in the 113th Congress.

For Obama Administration officials and the U.S. military, there is a clear desire to engage Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi’s new government on a host of issues, including immediate economic support and Sinai security. For others, opportunities for renewed diplomacy may be overshadowed by disruptive political trends that have been unleashed by the so-called Arab awakening and allowed for more expression of anti-Americanism, radical Islamist politics, antipathy toward Israel, and sectarianism, among others.

For FY2013, President Obama is requesting $1.55 billion in total bilateral aid to Egypt ($1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million in economic aid). The aid levels requested are unchanged from FY2012 appropriations. Under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, FY2013 (H.J.Res. 117, P.L. 112-175), approved by Congress in September 2012, regular aid accounts (ESF, FMF, etc.) are funded at the same level as in FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) plus .612%. Conditions placed on appropriations in the FY2012 bill apply to FY2013 CR funds unless otherwise noted.



Date of Report: February 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 25
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations



Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010.

The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2012 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano to the agency’s Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council’s demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.

Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters.

This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.



Date of Report: January 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R40094
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