Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin
Coordinator Specialist in Nonproliferation

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed, or are in the process of destroying, these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs. The Syrian government acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 14, 2013. This convention requires its member states to eliminate all of their chemical weapon stocks, munitions, precursor chemicals, and related production and storage facilities.

A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria, which could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. The largest-scale use to date was on August 21, 2013. A U.N. inspection team began working in Syria on August 19, 2013, and completed their mission on August 31. The U.N. team’s investigative report confirmed the large-scale use of sarin nerve agent against civilians in the Ghouta area of Damascus on August 21.

President Barack Obama and other world leaders had said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. For example, President Obama suggested during an August 2012 press briefing that the United States might take military action against Syria if Damascus used or lost control of its chemical weapons, explaining that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus.”

On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with “military action against Syrian regime targets” in response to the August 21 attack and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons “on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.” The statement added that, in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President had authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.

However, President Obama subsequently explained in a September 10 speech that he had asked congressional leaders to postpone a vote to authorize the use of military force in order to give the Administration time to pursue a new diplomatic initiative. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem stated the previous day that Damascus had accepted a proposal presented by the Russian government, according to which Syria would turn over its chemical weapons for international control and supervised destruction. The United Nations Security Council is discussing a draft resolution designed to accomplish this goal. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented a proposed Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, which outlines deadlines and actions required. Key issues for
implementation of chemical weapons destruction in Syria include verification, inspectors’ access, destruction method and location, and the security of international personnel.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are also concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. These programs may also be used to contribute financial or in-kind technical assistance to the OPCW mission to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.


Date of Report: September 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 32
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Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Coordinator
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed, or are in the process of destroying, these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. The largestscale use to date was on August 21, 2013. A U.N. inspection team began working in Syria on August 19, 2013 and completed their mission on August 31. Laboratories are currently analyzing samples collected by the inspectors.

President Barack Obama and other world leaders had said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. For example, President Obama suggested during an August 2012 press briefing that the United States might take military action against Syria if Damascus used or lost control of its chemical weapons, explaining that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus.”

On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with “military action against Syrian regime targets” and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons “on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.” The statement added that, in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President had authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.

However, President Obama subsequently explained in a September 10 speech that he had asked congressional leaders to postpone a vote to authorize the use of military force in order to give the Administration time to pursue a new diplomatic initiative. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem stated the previous day that Damascus had accepted a proposal presented by the Russian government, according to which Syria would turn over its chemical weapons for international control and supervised destruction. The United Nations Security Council is discussing a French draft resolution designed to accomplish this goal. Key issues for negotiation include verification procedures, inspectors’ access, and security of international personnel.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are also concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of
control during a regime collapse. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.

Date of Report: September 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 29
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Elizabeth Rybicki, Coordinator

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Any time the Senate is considering a question—whether that question is a bill, amendment, motion, conference report, or something else—a Senator who has the floor can “ask for the yeas and nays” or a roll call vote on that question. This is the constitutional right of any Senator, and no other lawmaker can object to the request. If such a request is supported by 10 other Senators (for a total of 11) this usually requires the Senate to conduct a roll call vote (also called a vote by “the yeas and nays”) to decide the question it is considering. The Senate can agree to order a roll call vote on a question at any time when it is debating that question. Ordering the yeas and nays, however, does not determine when that vote will take place.

The authority for Senators to obtain roll call votes derives from Article I, Section 5, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that “the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal.” The Constitution also provides that “a majority of each [house] shall constitute a quorum to do business.” Therefore, “one fifth of those present” to order the yeas and nays must be one-fifth of at least 51 Senators (or at least 11 Senators), which is the minimal majority required to satisfy the constitutional quorum requirement. A smaller number of Senators cannot order a roll call vote, even by unanimous consent, because the Senate may not set aside any constitutional requirement governing its proceedings.


Date of Report: September 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 40
Order Number: 95-1013
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Iran Sanctions

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Increasingly strict sanctions on Iran—sanctions that primarily target Iran’s key energy sector and its access the international financial system—have harmed Iran’s economy, but not to the point where key Iran leaders have agreed to international proposals to limit Iran’s nuclear program to purely peaceful purposes. However, the June 14, 2013, election as president of Hassan Rouhani, who ran on a platform that included achieving an easing of sanctions, suggests that many Iranians want their leaders to compromise on the nuclear issue if doing so will improve the economy.

• Oil exports fund nearly half of Iran’s government expenditures, and Iran’s oil exports have declined to just over 1 million barrels—less than half of the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. The causes of the drop have been a European Union embargo on purchases of Iranian crude oil and decisions by other Iranian oil customers to obtain exemptions from U.S. sanctions by substantially reducing purchases of Iranian oil. Twenty of Iran’s oil customers maintain such exemptions.

• The loss of revenues from oil, coupled with the cut-off of Iran from the international banking system, has caused a sharp drop in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial, raised inflation to over 50%, and caused much of Iran’s oil revenues to sit unused in third-country accounts. Iran’s economy shrank slightly from 2012-2013 and will likely do so again during 2013. There have also been unintended consequences including a shortage of some advanced medicines.

• Iran has mitigated some of the economic and political effects of sanctions. Government-linked entities are creating front companies and making increased use of barter trade. Iranian traders are using informal banking exchange mechanisms and, benefitting from the fall in the value of Iran’s currency, increasing non-oil exports or exports of hydrocarbon products other than crude oil, such as gas condensates. Affluent Iranians have invested in—and driven up prices for—real estate and securities listed on the Tehran stock exchange. Sanctions have not compelled Iran to change its position on its nuclear program, but might be slowing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs by hampering Iran’s ability to obtain needed foreign technology. U.S. assessments indicate that sanctions have not stopped Iran from developing new conventional weaponry indigenously. Based largely on its provision of arms to the embattled Assad government in Syria, Iran is also judged as not complying with U.N. requirements that it halt any weapons shipments outside its borders. And, sanctions do not appear to have altered Iran’s repression of dissent or its efforts to monitor public use of the Internet.

Some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase. In the 112th Congress, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) made sanctionable the shipping of Iranian crude oil, and it enhanced human rights-related provisions of previous Iran-related laws. A provision of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) sanctions transactions with several key sectors of Iran’s economy. A bill in the 113th Congress, H.R. 850, passed by the House on July 31, 2013, would expand the range of Iranian economic sectors subject to sanctions, sanction banks that exchange Iran’s hard currency abroad, and accelerate the oil purchase reductions required to maintain a sanctions exemption. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: September 9, 2013
Number of Pages: 82
Order Number: RS20871
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