Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
This report provides an overview and analysis of U.S.-Yemeni relations
amidst evolving political change in Yemeni leadership, ongoing U.S.
counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) operatives at large in Yemen’s hinterlands, and international efforts to bolster
the country’s stability despite an array of daunting socio-economic problems.
Congress and U.S. policymakers may be concerned with prospects for
stabilizing Yemen and establishing strong bilateral relations with future
Yemeni leaders.
On November 23, 2011, after eleven months of protests and violence that claimed
over 2,000 lives, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen signed on to
a U.S.-backed, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered transition plan. In
line with the plan, Yemen held a presidential election in February 2012
with one consensus candidate on the ballot—former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour
al Hadi. He received 6.6 million votes and, on February 25, 2012, he was
inaugurated before parliament.
Many Administration officials have declared that AQAP, the Yemeni-based
terrorist organization that has attempted on several occasions to attack
the U.S. homeland, is the most lethal of the Al Qaeda affiliates. In
recent years, the Administration and Congress have supported an increased U.S.
commitment of resources to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there.
Many analysts assert that Yemen is becoming a failed state and safe haven
for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater
for U.S. counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen’s contentious political
climate and its myriad development challenges, most long-time Yemen watchers
suggest that security problems emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of
increased U.S. or international efforts to combat them.
Date of Report: November 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 12
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Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Nearly two years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, increasingly
violent sectarian divisions are undermining Iraq’s stability. Sunni Arab
Muslims, who resent Shiite political domination and perceived
discrimination, have escalated their political opposition to the government
of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki through demonstrations and violence. Iraq’s
Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad
government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts
delayed some provincial elections during April-June 2013 and could affect
the viability of national elections for a new parliament and government set for
April 30, 2014. Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that
vote.
The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent
group Al Qaeda in Iraq. The group, emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in
Syria as well as perceived discrimination against Sunni Iraqis, is
conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi Security Force
(ISF) members, and Sunni supporters of Maliki with increasing frequency and lethality.
The attacks appear intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict and provoke
the fall of the government. To date, the 800,000-person ISF has countered
the escalating violence without outside assistance and Iraqi forces have
not substantially fractured along sectarian lines. However, a July 2013
major prison break near Baghdad cast doubt on the ISF’s ability to counter the
violence that has killed nearly 7,000 Iraqis thus far this year—more than
double the figure for all of 2012. And there are indications that some
Shiite militias might be reactivating to retaliate for violence against
Shiites.
U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S.
troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and
military control. Some outside experts and some in Congress have asserted
that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed since. Program components of what were
to be enduring, close security relations—extensive U.S. training for Iraq’s
security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I) and
a State Department police development program—languished during 2011-2013.
However, Iraq continued to press to acquire sophisticated U.S. equipment such
as F-16 combat aircraft, air defense equipment, and attack helicopters, giving
the Administration some leverage over Baghdad. During his visit to Washington,
DC on October 29-November 1, 2013, Maliki pressed for accelerated U.S. arms sales
as part of an expansion of U.S.-Iraq security cooperation to help Iraq deal
with the growing violence.
The Administration and Congress seek to continue to cultivate Iraq as an ally
in part to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran, with which
the Maliki government has built close relations. Fearing that a change of
regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki
has not joined U.S. and other Arab state calls for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad
to leave office and Iraq has not consistently sought to prevent Iranian
overflights of arms deliveries to Syria. Still, the legacy of the
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Arab and Persian differences, Iraq’s efforts to
reestablish its place in the Arab world, and Maliki’s need to work with senior Iraqi
Sunnis limit Iranian influence over the Baghdad government. Iraq took a large
step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on
March 27-29, 2012, and has substantially repaired relations with Kuwait,
the state that Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied in 1990. In June 2013,
the relationship with Kuwait helped Iraq emerge from some Saddam-era restrictions
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Date of Report: November 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 50
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Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived
threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. Well before Iran’s
nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran in 2003,
the United States had seen Iran’s support for regional militant groups,
such as Lebanese Hezbollah, as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies.
To implement U.S. policy, the Obama Administration has orchestrated broad
international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably
demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for
purely peaceful purposes. The five rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in
2012 and 2013—prior to the June 14, 2013, election of relative moderate Hassan
Rouhani as president—explored a potential compromise under which Iran might
cease producing medium enriched uranium (20% Uranium-235, not technically far
from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. International
sanctions have harmed Iran’s economy, and Rouhani’s election appeared to
reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces
an easing of international sanctions.
Rouhani’s election substantially improved prospects for a nuclear issue
settlement as well as an end to the 34 years of U.S.-Iran estrangement. On
September 27, 2013, President Obama and Rouhani spoke by phone—the first
leadership level contacts since the 1979 Islamic revolution— as Rouhani
departed a week-long visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York.
In their speeches to the Assembly, both President Obama and Rouhani
indicated that the nuclear issue could be settled—perhaps within six
months—and that the long era of U.S.-Iran hostility could be ended. The
week also included the first foreign ministerial meeting between the two countries,
and a decision to hold another round of talks on the nuclear issue on October
15-16, 2013. Those talks were productive, by all accounts, and resulted in
a decision to meet again November 7-8, 2013. Those meetings were extended
one day and, by all accounts, came close to agreement on a draft outlining
an interim limitation of Iran’s nuclear program. There is optimism that an
interim agreement will be finalized during the next round of talks on November
20, 2013.
President Obama has maintained—both before and after the Rouhani election—that
the option of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities
remains open. However, the apparent progress in negotiations is likely to
forestall further U.S. discussion of military options against Iran. The Administration
is also requesting the Senate postpone moving ahead with a Senate version of an expanded
Iran sanctions bill, H.R. 850, which passed the House on July 31, 2013. That
bill would enable Iran’s major oil customers to avoid sanctions if they
cut their purchases of Iranian oil to minimal levels. The government of
Israel expresses skepticism of Rouhani’s intentions and continues to
assert that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear
facilities if Iran appears on the cusp of developing a nuclear weapon.
Rouhani’s presidency has the potential to increase the domestic popularity of
Iran’s regime if he implements campaign pledges to ease repression and
social restrictions. His unexpected election win—a result of a large
turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election
results—appeared to counter the views of many experts who assessed the domestic reform
movement as cowed by regime suppression and inactive. In September 2013,
Rouhani’s government released nearly 80 political prisoners. For further
information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations,
by Paul K. Kerr.
Date of Report: November 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 79
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