Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a

broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s advancing nuclear program. Well

before the nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran, the United States had

seen Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to

undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of actively helping Syria’s

leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there.

The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try

to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is

peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did

explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a

level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Further

high-level talks took place on February 26-27, 2013, and April 5-6, 2013, both in Almaty,

Kazakhstan. No breakthroughs were achieved in Almaty. Iran’s Supreme Leader has not taken up

U.S. offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are required to produce

a breakthrough. And, there is an emerging consensus that international sanctions—although

severely harming Iran’s economy—have not pressured the regime to the point at which it is

compelled to compromise.

The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s

nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the point where Iran could produce a nuclear

weapon relatively quickly. President Obama Administration says the option of U.S. military

action against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open, but he has asserted that there is still time—

although increasingly limited—for diplomacy. He reiterated this position during his March 2013

visit to Israel.

Some experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part because of Iran’s

growing international isolation and in part because of its repression, although not to the point

where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The domestic opposition remains relatively weak

and outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the political

dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and the major candidates in the presidential

election to be held on June 14, 2013, are Khamene’i loyalists. Two major figures considered a

potential threat to the ruling establishment, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s close

aide and protégé, were barred from running by the ruling clerics.

The 112th Congress supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with

enactment of the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws

expand sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and precious

metals transactions with Iran. Additional Iran sanctions bills, such as H.R. 850, are in varying

stages of consideration in the 113th Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871,

Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program:

Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.

Date of Report: May 28, 2013
Number of Pages: 78
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Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has secured chemical weapons, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.

Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed three alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. None have been confirmed by U.S. officials. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate.

According to letters sent April 25, 2013, to Senators John McCain and Carl Levin by Miguel Rodriguez, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, the U.S. intelligence community “does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin.” The Obama Administration has emphasized that the evidence is not definitive, however, and that additional investigation is needed.

President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could possibly mean the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.


Date of Report: May 31, 2013
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Iran Sanctions

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Increasingly strict sanctions on Iran—which target primarily Iran’s key energy sector as well as its ability to access the international financial system—have harmed Iran’s economy, but not to the point where key Iran leaders have been compelled to reach a compromise with the international community on Iran’s nuclear program. And, the strategic effects of sanctions might be abating as Iran adjusts to them economically and advertises the adverse humanitarian effects.

• Oil exports fund nearly half of Iran’s government expenditures, and Iran’s oil exports have declined to about 1.25 million barrels—a halving from the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. The causes of the drop have been a European Union embargo on purchases of Iranian crude oil that took full effect on July 1, 2012, and decisions by several other Iranian oil customers to substantially reduce purchases of Iranian oil. To date, 20 of Iran’s oil customers have reduced Iranian oil imports sufficiently to achieve an exemption from U.S. sanctions under the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).

• The loss of revenues from oil, coupled with the cut-off of Iran from the international banking system, has caused a collapse in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial. That collapse has increased inflation to over 50%, according to many experts. Iran’s economy shrank slightly from 2012-2013 and will likely shrink again during 2013. There have also been unintended consequences including a shortage of some advanced Western-made medicines.

• However, Iran has found ways to mitigate the economic and political effects of sanctions. Government-linked entities are creating front companies and making increased use of barter trade. Iranian traders are using informal banking exchange mechanisms and, benefitting from the fall in the value of Iran’s currency, sharply increasing non-oil exports such as agricultural goods, minerals, and industrial goods. Affluent Iranians are investing in hard assets such as real estate.

Although sanctions have not compelled Iran to change its position on its nuclear program, sanctions may be slowing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs by hampering Iran’s ability to obtain needed technology from foreign sources. However, Department of Defense and other assessments indicate that sanctions have not stopped Iran from developing some new weaponry indigenously. Iran is also judged not complying with U.N. requirements that it halt any weapons shipments outside its borders, particularly by providing arms to the embattled Assad government in Syria. And, sanctions do not appear to have altered Iran’s repression of dissent or its efforts to monitor public use of the Internet.

Some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase. In the 112th Congress, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) made sanctionable the shipping of Iranian crude oil, and it enhanced human rights-related provisions of previous Iran-related laws. A provision of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) sanctions transactions with several key sectors of Iran’s economy. A bill in the 113th Congress, H.R. 850, ordered to be reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 22, 2013, would authorize, but not mandate, U.S. sanctions against nearly all trade with Iran and it would sanction banks that exchange Iran’s hard currency abroad. For a broader analysis of policy on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: May 31, 2013
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide during the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, was reduced to a “pre-surge” level of about 66,000 as of September 20, 2012. An additional 34,000 will leave by February 2014, but the bulk of that drawdown will take place in late 2013- early 2014. The size of the international force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is to be announced later in May or in June 2013, with options narrowing to 8,000 – 12,000, of which the majority would be U.S. forces. The primary mission will be to train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), but some international forces will engage in counter-terrorism missions as well. The U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation. Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.

The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. Among efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 5, 2014, will be devoid of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but informal discussions have continued and even evolved into exchanges of specific proposals. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.

The United States and other donors continue to implement various development projects— particularly those for water, power, and roads. To prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement, U.S. officials assert that Afghanistan might be able to exploit vast mineral and agricultural resources, as well as its potentially significant hydrocarbon resources. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success.

Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. About $9.7 billion in aid, including ANSF training, is being provided in FY2013 and the economic aid request for FY2014 is over $2.1 billion (excluding train and equip funding). As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: May 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 89
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