Engaging North Korea: An Element of the Global War on Terrorism

The North Korean nuclear weapons issue has culminated in a climactic standoff between the ill-equipped and undernourished nation and the rest of the world. Kim Jong Il has continued to defy the world community regarding missile testing and the desire to possess nuclear weapons. With North Korea becoming a confirmed nuclear power, the potential for radical instability in the Northeast Asian region exists to a greater degree than ever seen before in the post-Cold War era. The challenge for the United States and the world community is exactly how to handle this possibly disastrous turn of events. The Bush Administration policy of preemption when required, and the aggressive nature of its rhetoric regarding rogue states, may have caused North Korea to feel as if it may be the next battlefield enemy for the United States, and hence continue its missile and nuclear weapons testing. With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and continued operations in Iraq, it is imperative that the United States avoid another military crisis. A diplomatic solution must be seriously explored and would be in concert with American published strategic documents from the highest levels. Beginning a line of bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks will allow the United States to meet its strategic goals related to the GWOT that apply to the Korean peninsula, including the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat.


Date of Report: July 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 81
Order Number: G2259
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Engaging North Korea: The Road Ahead

For the past half-century, United States forces have been stationed in Korea as a deterrent to communist expansion and as a symbol of U.S. resolve to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) against North Korean aggression. Over the past decade, a declining and increasingly isolated North Korea has reached out to the international community, raising the prospect for positive change and peaceful reconciliation between long-standing adversaries. With North Korean belligerence the most obvious reason for maintaining U.S. presence on the peninsula, successful engagement between North and South Korea could have an obvious impact on the US/ROK alliance. Given the significance of this relationship to U.S. security strategy, this study examines ongoing engagement efforts between North Korea and the outside world, reviewing the progress, impact and effects these rapprochement initiatives could have in shaping the future of the Korean peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia.


Date of Report: July 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: G2258
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Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance

Susan B. Epstein
Specialist in Foreign Policy

K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs

In the post-2001 era, the United States has viewed Pakistan as a key ally, especially in the context of counterterrorism and Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance both historically and in recent years, although assistance levels have has fluctuated considerably over the decades of Pakistani independence. In the wake of 9/11, however, aid to Pakistan increased steadily. Since 1948, the United States has pledged more than $30 billion in direct aid, about half for military assistance, and more than two-thirds appropriated in the post-2001 period. Many observers question the gains accrued to date, variously identifying poor planning, lack of both transparency and capacity, corruption, and slow reform by the Pakistani government as major obstacles. Moreover, any goodwill generated by U.S. aid is offset by widespread and intense anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani people.

Developments in 2011 put immense strains on bilateral relations, making uncertain the future direction of the U.S. aid program. Relations have remained tense since that time, although civilian aid has continued to flow and substantive defense transfers are set to resume later in 2013. Disruptions in 2011 included the killing of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city and a NATO military raid into Pakistani territory near Afghanistan that inadvertently left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead. The latter development led Islamabad to bar U.S. and NATO access to vital ground lines of communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea for a period of more than seven months. More recently, the 113th Congress is focusing on measures to reduce the federal budget deficit. This backdrop appears to be further influencing debate over assistance levels to a topranking recipient that many say lacks accountability and even credibility as a U.S. ally. For many lawmakers, the core issue remains balancing Pakistan’s strategic importance to the United States—not least its role in Afghan reconciliation efforts—with the pervasive and mutual distrust bedeviling the bilateral relationship.

The 111th Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73) authorizing the President to provide $1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five years (FY2010-FY2014) and requiring annual certification for release of security-related aid. Such conditionality is a contentious issue. Congress also established two new funds in 2009, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF, within Defense Department appropriations) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF, within State-Foreign Operations Appropriations). The 112th Congress enacted further conditions and limitations on assistance. Among these were certification requirements for nearly all FY2012 assistance (in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012—P.L. 112-74) and for FY2013 Coalition Support Funds (CSF, military reimbursements funded out of the Pentagon) and PCF (in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013—P.L. 112-239). Similar provisions appear in pending FY2014 legislation. In September 2012, the Administration waived FY2012 certification requirements under included national security provisions and, in February 2013, it issued a waiver to allow for the transfer of major defense equipment in FY2013.

The Administration has requested nearly $1.2 billion economic and security aid to Pakistan for FY2014. This represents a steep decline from total FY2012 assistance of about $1.9 billion (excluding CSF). Estimated FY2013 allocations are not yet available. This report will be updated as warranted by events. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, by Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt.


Date of Report: July 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 51
Order Number: R41856
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010.

The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy the council’s demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol.

Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but the agency still has questions regarding “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters.

This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.


Date of Report: June 24, 2013
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R40094
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Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation

The use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may wish to assess the Administration’s plans to respond to possible scenarios involving the use, change of hands, or loss of control of Syrian chemical weapons.

Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical weapons, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad reportedly has stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles, and associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality. Little is known from open sources about the current size and condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or are in the process of destroying them. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs.

While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policymakers are concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse.

Reports in early December 2012 quoted unnamed officials as saying intelligence showed possible preparations for use, but this was denied by the Syrian government. Since then, press reports have discussed several alleged incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. A United Nations chemical weapons inspection team is negotiating with Syria on access to the sites to investigate.

On June 13, 2013, the White House released a statement saying that following its investigation, “our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year. Our intelligence community has high confidence in that assessment given multiple, independent streams of information.” The June 13 statement said that CW use had resulted in estimated 100-150 deaths in Syria.

President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations. The June 13 White House statement said that in response to the Asad regime’s use of chemical weapons, the President has authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.

During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios in advance.

For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.


Date of Report: June 14, 2013
Number of Pages: 18
Order Number: R42848
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