Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

More than one year after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, increasingly violent sectarian divisions are undermining the fragile stability left in place. Sunni Arab Muslims, who resent Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination, have escalated their political opposition to the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki through demonstrations as well as violence. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on separate disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts impinged on provincial elections during April—June 2013 and could affect the viability of national elections for a new parliament and government scheduled for in 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.

The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) as well as groups linked to the former regime of Saddam Hussein. These groups, emboldened by the Sunni-led uprising in Syria, are conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members, and Sunni supporters of Maliki with increasing frequency and lethality. The attacks appear intended to reignite all-out sectarian conflict and provoke the fall of the government. To date, the 700,000 person ISF has countered the escalating violence without outside assistance or substantial advice and Iraqi forces have not substantially fractured along sectarian lines.

U.S. forces left in December 2011 in line with a November 2008 bilateral U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. Iraq refused to extend the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, seeking to put behind it the period of U.S. political and military control. Since the U.S. pullout, outside experts and some in Congress have asserted that U.S. influence over Iraq has ebbed significantly—risking the legacy of U.S. combat deaths and funds spent on the intervention. Program components of what were to be enduring, close security relations—U.S. training for Iraq’s security forces through an Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program—have largely languished in part because Iraqi officials perceive the programs as indicators of residual U.S. tutelage. The U.S. civilian presence in Iraq has declined from about 17,000 to about 10,500 and is expected to fall to 5,500 by the end of 2013. Still, Iraqi efforts to acquire sophisticated U.S. equipment such as F-16 combat aircraft and air defense equipment gives the Administration some leverage over Baghdad.

Although recognizing that Iraq wants to rebuild its relations in its immediate neighborhood, the Administration and Congress seek to prevent Iraq from falling under the sway of Iran, with which the Maliki government has built close relations. Apparently fearing that a change of regime in Syria will further embolden the Iraqi Sunni opposition, Maliki has not joined U.S. and other country calls for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad to leave office. However, the legacy of Iran- Iraq hostilities, Arab and Persian differences, and Maliki’s need to work with senior Sunnis limit Iranian influence over the Baghdad government. Another limitation on Iranian influence is Iraq’s effort to reestablish its historic role as a major player in the Arab world. Iraq took a large step toward returning to the Arab fold by hosting an Arab League summit on March 27-29, 2012, and has substantially repaired relations with Kuwait, the state that Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied in 1990. In June 2013, the relationship with Kuwait helped Iraq emerge from some Saddam-era restrictions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.


Date of Report: July 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 50
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The uprising against Bahrain’s Al Khalifa royal family that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, amidst other regional uprisings, has not come close to changing Bahrain’s regime. However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its campaign to achieve its stated goal of establishing a constitutional monarchy or, at the very least, winning greatly increased political influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the modest reform efforts instituted during 1999-2010.

The government has held dialogue with the opposition to try to address its grievances. A “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were elevated further by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented most of the 26 BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation has been modest. After more than one year of impasse, both sides resumed a dialogue in February 2013, but it has made little concrete progress, by all accounts.

The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized its human rights abuses and urged it to undertake more substantial political reform. The U.S. criticism has angered some Al Khalifa officials but it has also dissatisfied human rights activists who assert that the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests— particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” that entitled it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, in 2011 the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Since 2012, the State Department has held up some sales of small arms and light weapons that could poentially be used against protesters. In mid-May 2012 the Administration announced that it would proceed with the sale of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can only use for external defense.

Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Bahrain has strongly criticized the entry of the Iranbacked Shiite group Lebanese Hezbollah into the Syria conflict on the side of President Bashar Al Assad.

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies and therefore lacks ample resources to significantly improve Shiite standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained, although not crippled, Bahrain’s economy. 

Date of Report: July 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 41
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

The capacity and transparency of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability after U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but it remains weak and rampant with corruption. Even as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai has concentrated much authority in Kabul through his constitutional powers of appointment at all levels. Karzai is constitutionally term-limited, but some Afghan leaders are concerned that he plans to use state election machinery to support the election of a successor in the April 5, 2014, presidential and provincial elections. Fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) was extensively documented, but Afghan officials, scrutinized by opposition ties, civil society organizations, and key donor countries, have taken some steps to improve election oversight for the April 2014 elections.

Fears about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing widespread nepotism and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of support from senior Afghan government leaders who oppose prosecuting their political allies. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, on the condition that Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption. Afghan progress on that issue was assessed relatively unfavorably at the end of a Tokyo process review meeting on July 3, 2013.

No matter how the Afghan leadership succession process works out, there is concern among many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners reduce their involvement in Afghanistan. Several leaders of an informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders—who have always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure—have begun to plan for the 2014 end of the international security mission. Many Afghans look to these faction leaders, rather than to the government, to protect them from possible civil conflict with the Taliban after 2014. But, an increase in the influence of faction leaders could produce even more corruption, arbitrary administration of justice, and human rights abuses than has been the case since the international intervention in 2001.

President Karzai is appealing to nationalist sentiment to attract Taliban support to rejoin Afghan politics, but Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that a full reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics could reverse some of the human and women’s rights gains since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islam and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: July 8, 2013
Number of Pages: 63
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Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Prior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States had consistently praised the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, for gradually opening the political process without evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization has, to date, allowed Omanis a measure of representation but has not significantly limited Qaboos’ role as paramount decisionmaker. The modest reforms have not satisfied some Omani civil society leaders, youths, and others, and this disappointment produced protests in several Omani cities in 2011. The domestic popularity of Qaboos, some additional economic and political reform measures, and repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. High turnout in the October 15, 2011, elections for the lower house of Oman’s legislative body suggested that unrest—and the accelerated reforms launched in response—were producing a new public sense of activism, although with public recognition that reform will continue to be gradual. The first-ever municipal elections in Oman on December 22, 2012 furthered the sense of political empowerment among the electorate.

Perhaps because Oman is a long-time U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf, the Obama Administration did not alter policy toward Oman even though some of the 2011-2012 protests were suppressed and activists were arrested. Oman was the first Persian Gulf state to formally allow the U.S. military to use its military facilities, despite the sensitivities in Oman about a visible U.S. military presence there. It hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980 and has become a significant buyer of U.S. military equipment, moving away from its prior reliance on British military advice and equipment. Oman is also a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the movement of terrorists and pirates in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. It has consistently supported U.S. efforts to achieve a Middle East peace by publicly endorsing peace treaties reached and by occasionally meeting with Israeli leaders in or outside Oman. It was partly in appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy to compensate for its relatively small reserves of crude oil.

The one significant difference between the United States and Oman on regional issues is Iran. Unlike most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, Oman does not perceive a major potential threat from Iran. Sultan Qaboos has consistently maintained ties to Iran’s leaders, despite the widespread international criticism of Iran’s nuclear program and foreign policy. However, successive U.S. Administrations have generally refrained from criticizing the Iran-Oman relationship, perhaps in part because Oman has sometimes been useful as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. Oman played the role of broker between Iran and the United States in the September 2011 release of two U.S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there, and it reportedly is involved in efforts to obtain the release of other U.S. citizens imprisoned in Iran or in territory under Iran’s control. For further information on regional dynamics that affect Oman, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: July 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 22
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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the United States. Kuwait remains a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily in the northern Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the post-Saddam government in Iraq have warmed significantly in recent years through resolution of many of the territorial, economic, and political issues from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran from exerting undue influence in Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.

Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since 2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. The political disputes in Kuwait have centered on opposition to the political dominance of the Al Sabah family, as well as over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. These disputes, manifested primarily in the form of opposition to the Al Sabah family within the National Assembly, have produced repeated dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections. The latest suspension occurred on June 16, 2013, and triggered new elections to be held on July 27, 2013. Perhaps accelerated by the uprisings in several Arab countries since early 2011, the disputes in Kuwait have also expanded beyond the Assembly to the general population. Public protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge the Sabah regime’s unilateral alteration of election rules to shape the December 1, 2012, elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly progovernment Assembly. The demonstrations sometimes have been suspended after compromises with the government.

Yet, the ruling establishment in Kuwait retains substantial assets that will likely prevent major political change. Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. Reflecting that sentiment, the opposition largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. To contain unrest, the government is able to use financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for several major investment projects has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.

On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council. This deference is evident in Kuwait’s stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. Kuwait has largely confined its support for the armed rebellion in Syria to financial aid. On the uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground forces. .


Date of Report: July 10, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
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