Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran’s history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran’s regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition “Green movement” that took place for the six months following Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010.
Iran’s refusal to accept the details of an October 1, 2009, tentative agreement on nuclear issues— a framework that was the product of nearly a year of diplomacy with Iran—caused the Administration to shift toward building multilateral support for additional economic sanctions against Iran. The Administration efforts bore fruit throughout the summer of 2010 with the adoption of new sanctions by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). Still, the Administration and its partners assert that these sanctions were intended to support diplomacy with Iran to limit its nuclear program. Iran accepted December 6-7, 2010, talks in Geneva with the six power contact group negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported. There was agreement for follow-on talks in Turkey on January 21-22, 2011, talks which, by all accounts, made no progress and did not result in agreement to set further talks. Prior to the meeting, U.S. officials indicated that additional pressure could be forthcoming if there were no clear results.
There is broad agreement that the U.S., U.N., and other sanctions enacted since mid-2010 are pressing Iran economically and, in conjunction with other measures, have even slowed Iran’s nuclear program directly. Iran is reacting to the economic pressure, in part, by trying to restructure its economy to reduce subsidies and suppress demand for such imported items as gasoline. The apparent slowing of its nuclear program has reduced open discussion in Israel or in U.S. expert circles about using military action to set Iran’s nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions. Some believe that only a victory by the domestic opposition in Iran, which in late 2009 appeared to pose a potentially serious challenge to the regime’s grip on power, can permanently reduce the multiplicity of threats posed by Iran’s regime. Legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition’s prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran’s human rights practices. Some observers believe that initiatives in the 112th Congress are likely to focus on providing additional help to those in Iran who want to change the regime, a prospect that may have been advanced by the ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak by a youth-led democracy movement similar to Iran’s Green movement. Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition’s prospects would be reduced by any open U.S. support. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
Date of Report: February 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 72
Order Number: RL32048
Price: $29.95
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Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran’s history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran’s regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition “Green movement” that took place for the six months following Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010.
Iran’s refusal to accept the details of an October 1, 2009, tentative agreement on nuclear issues— a framework that was the product of nearly a year of diplomacy with Iran—caused the Administration to shift toward building multilateral support for additional economic sanctions against Iran. The Administration efforts bore fruit throughout the summer of 2010 with the adoption of new sanctions by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). Still, the Administration and its partners assert that these sanctions were intended to support diplomacy with Iran to limit its nuclear program. Iran accepted December 6-7, 2010, talks in Geneva with the six power contact group negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported. There was agreement for follow-on talks in Turkey on January 21-22, 2011, talks which, by all accounts, made no progress and did not result in agreement to set further talks. Prior to the meeting, U.S. officials indicated that additional pressure could be forthcoming if there were no clear results.
There is broad agreement that the U.S., U.N., and other sanctions enacted since mid-2010 are pressing Iran economically and, in conjunction with other measures, have even slowed Iran’s nuclear program directly. Iran is reacting to the economic pressure, in part, by trying to restructure its economy to reduce subsidies and suppress demand for such imported items as gasoline. The apparent slowing of its nuclear program has reduced open discussion in Israel or in U.S. expert circles about using military action to set Iran’s nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions. Some believe that only a victory by the domestic opposition in Iran, which in late 2009 appeared to pose a potentially serious challenge to the regime’s grip on power, can permanently reduce the multiplicity of threats posed by Iran’s regime. Legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition’s prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran’s human rights practices. Some observers believe that initiatives in the 112th Congress are likely to focus on providing additional help to those in Iran who want to change the regime, a prospect that may have been advanced by the ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak by a youth-led democracy movement similar to Iran’s Green movement. Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition’s prospects would be reduced by any open U.S. support. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions; CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status.
Date of Report: February 14, 2011
Number of Pages: 72
Order Number: RL32048
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
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