Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Iraq’s political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and sectarian political and sometimes violent infighting continues, often involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting—and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities—significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic help, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. The agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is serving a second term, was implemented when a broad-based cabinet was confirmed on December 21, 2010.

Among ongoing schisms, Sunni Arabs fear that Maliki and his Shiite allies seek to monopolize power. The Kurds are wary that Maliki will not honor pledges to resolve Kurd-Arab territorial and financial disputes. There are significant tensions between Sunni Arabs and the Kurds over territory and governance in parts of northern Iraq, particularly Nineveh Province. Some Iraqi communities, including Christians, are not necessarily at odds with the government but they have been targeted by insurgent attacks in late 2010 and early 2011. These differences have created conditions under which the insurgency that hampered U.S. policy during 2004-2008 continues to linger and to occasionally succeed in conducting high casualty attacks.

These splits cloud the approaching completion of a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, in keeping with a 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. With the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, U.S. forces have dropped to 47,000, from a 2008 high of 170,000. The continuing high-profile attacks, coupled with deficiencies in Iraq’s 650,000 member security forces, cause U.S. officials to question Iraqi stability were the United States to withdraw completely as provided in the Security Agreement. There are also continuing U.S. concerns over Iranian influence over Iraq as U.S. forces depart, particularly given the activism of radical pro- Iranian Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. In several high-level visits and statements during 2011, senior U.S. officials have said that Iraq should request a continuing presence of U.S. forces after 2011; no specific troop numbers have been mentioned. However, an Iraqi decision on such a request is hampered by all the same political schisms discussed above, as well as the Sadr threats to rearm his followers if U.S. forces remain after 2011. If all U.S. troops leave at the end of 2011, some question the ability of the U.S. State Department to secure its facilities and personnel and to carry out its mission on its own.

The Administration is hopeful that, as a U.S. drawdown or complete withdrawal proceeds, all factions will cooperate to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took action on some longstalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. However, the lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011. The demonstrations were partly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other Middle Eastern countries, but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale political change. Some force has been used to suppress them, but the main effect has been to renew tensions among and within major factions rather than to prompt new attempts to improve government performance.


Date of Report: June 10, 2011
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: RS21968
Price: $29.95

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