Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
The uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, began a political crisis that has defied resolution. The crisis has been more intense than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain and demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the reform efforts instituted during 1999-2010 or since the uprising began. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament produces the government, but many in the Sunni minority government of the Al Khalifa family believe the Shiites want outright rule.
In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government proposals early in the crisis. The government asserts it has already implemented about two-thirds of the BICI recommendations—an assertion corroborated by a national commission appointed to oversee implementation and a “follow-up committee.” However, stalemate on more substantial political reforms—a product of hardened positions on both the government and opposition sides—has stoked continued demonstrations. Some fear that the unrest could evolve into violent insurgency. Neighboring Saudi Arabia, which has significant political and economic influence over the Bahraini government, is said to oppose compromise by the Al Khalifa.
The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime. It has criticized the regime’s use of force and raids against protesters and their homes, urged the government to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime to securing the Persian Gulf. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years. Beyond that facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can potentially use to protect itself and support U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained Bahrain’s economy.
Date of Report: August 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 38
Order Number: 95-1013
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