Kenneth
Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
The
uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, at the outbreak of the
uprisings that swept several Middle Eastern leaders from power, began a
political crisis that has defied resolution. The crisis since 2011 has
been more intense than previous periods of unrest in Bahrain, and
demonstrates that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution
of power and economic opportunities have not been satisfied by reform
efforts instituted since 1999. The bulk of the Shiite majority in Bahrain
says it demands a constitutional monarchy in which an elected parliament
produces the government, but many in the Sunni minority government of the Al
Khalifa family believe the Shiites want outright rule.
In March 2011, Bahrain’s government rejected U.S. advice by inviting direct
security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries,
declaring a state of emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and
arresting dissident leaders and pro-opposition health care workers.
Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, a “national dialogue”
held in July 2011 reached consensus on only a few modest political
reforms. Hopes for resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a
government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI) on the
unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the government’s
actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s dismissal of all of
the government’s reform proposals. The government asserts it has
implemented most of the BICI recommendations—an assertion corroborated by
a national commission appointed to oversee implementation and a “follow-up
committee.” However, the upholding of prison sentences for prominent dissidents
and government refusal to agree to more substantial political reforms have
stoked continued frequent demonstrations. Adding to the deadlock is that
neighboring Saudi Arabia, which has significant political and economic
influence over the Bahraini government, is backing hardline Al Khalifa officials
that oppose compromise. Some fear that the unrest could evolve into violent
insurgency, a concern increased by the discovery of bombs and other
weaponry in 2012. Five bombs went off in Bahrain on November 5, 2012,
killing two non-Bahrainis.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime’s
past reforms, but it has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses,
urged the regime to undertake further political reform, and advanced ideas
to narrow government-opposition differences. The U.S. position has been
criticized by those who believe the United States is downplaying regime abuses
because of U.S. dependence on the security relationship with the Al
Khalifa regime to containing Iranian power. Bahrain has provided key
support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf
for over 60 years. Beyond that facility, the United States signed a formal
defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated Bahrain a “major
non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons
systems. Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some
Members of Congress, the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored
vehicles and anti-tank weapons. However, in mid-May 2012 the
Administration announced a resumption of other arms sales to Bahrain that
it can potentially use to protect itself and support any military effort against
Iran. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC
powers to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other
Persian Gulf monarchies. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain
signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was
signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained
Bahrain’s economy.
Date of Report: November 6, 2012
Number of Pages: 39
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