Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Prior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States had consistently praised the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, for gradually opening the political process without evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization has, to date, allowed Omanis a measure of representation but has not significantly limited Qaboos’ role as paramount decisionmaker. The modest reforms have not satisfied some Omani civil society leaders, youths, and others, and this disappointment produced protests in several Omani cities in 2011. The domestic popularity of Qaboos, some additional economic and political reform measures, and repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. High turnout in the October 15, 2011, elections for the lower house of Oman’s legislative body suggested that unrest—and the accelerated reforms launched in response—were producing a new public sense of activism, although with public recognition that reform will continue to be gradual. The first-ever municipal elections in Oman on December 22, 2012 furthered the sense of political empowerment among the electorate.

Perhaps because Oman is a long-time U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf, the Obama Administration did not alter policy toward Oman even though some of the 2011-2012 protests were suppressed and activists were arrested. Oman was the first Persian Gulf state to formally allow the U.S. military to use its military facilities, despite the sensitivities in Oman about a visible U.S. military presence there. It hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980 and has become a significant buyer of U.S. military equipment, moving away from its prior reliance on British military advice and equipment. Oman is also a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the movement of terrorists and pirates in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. It has consistently supported U.S. efforts to achieve a Middle East peace by publicly endorsing peace treaties reached and by occasionally meeting with Israeli leaders in or outside Oman. It was partly in appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy to compensate for its relatively small reserves of crude oil.

The one significant difference between the United States and Oman on regional issues is Iran. Unlike most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, Oman does not perceive a major potential threat from Iran. Sultan Qaboos has consistently maintained ties to Iran’s leaders, despite the widespread international criticism of Iran’s nuclear program and foreign policy. However, successive U.S. Administrations have generally refrained from criticizing the Iran-Oman relationship, perhaps in part because Oman has sometimes been useful as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. Oman played the role of broker between Iran and the United States in the September 2011 release of two U.S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there, and it reportedly is involved in efforts to obtain the release of other U.S. citizens imprisoned in Iran or in territory under Iran’s control. For further information on regional dynamics that affect Oman, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.


Date of Report: July 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 22
Order Number: RS21534
Price: $29.95

To Order:

RS21534.pdf   to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART

e-mail congress@pennyhill.com

Phone 301-253-0881

For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to end a strategic threat posed by Iraq, because of its location, its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression, and its close cooperation with the United States. Kuwait remains a key to the U.S. ability to act militarily in the northern Persian Gulf region now that all U.S. forces have left Iraq. Kuwait’s relations with the post-Saddam government in Iraq have warmed significantly in recent years through resolution of many of the territorial, economic, and political issues from the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait is increasingly suspicious of Iranian intentions in the Gulf, aligning Kuwait with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf and prevent Iran from exerting undue influence in Iraq. Still, Kuwait maintains relatively normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran militarily or prompt it to try to empower pro-Iranian elements in Kuwait.

Although Kuwait’s foreign policy fluctuates little, its political system has been in turmoil since 2006, and has deteriorated significantly since late 2012. The political disputes in Kuwait have centered on opposition to the political dominance of the Al Sabah family, as well as over official corruption, security force brutality, citizenship eligibility, and other issues. These disputes, manifested primarily in the form of opposition to the Al Sabah family within the National Assembly, have produced repeated dissolutions of the National Assembly and new elections. The latest suspension occurred on June 16, 2013, and triggered new elections to be held on July 27, 2013. Perhaps accelerated by the uprisings in several Arab countries since early 2011, the disputes in Kuwait have also expanded beyond the Assembly to the general population. Public protests expanded significantly in late 2012 to challenge the Sabah regime’s unilateral alteration of election rules to shape the December 1, 2012, elections to its advantage. Most oppositionists boycotted the December 1 elections, lowering the turnout but producing an overwhelmingly progovernment Assembly. The demonstrations sometimes have been suspended after compromises with the government.

Yet, the ruling establishment in Kuwait retains substantial assets that will likely prevent major political change. Kuwait remains a relatively wealthy society where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule through violence. Reflecting that sentiment, the opposition largely confines its demands to limiting Sabah power rather than ending the family’s rule. To contain unrest, the government is able to use financial largesse—budgets loaded with subsidies and salary increases—as well as some repressive measures, including beatings and imprisonments. But, the many years of political paralysis have led to some economic stagnation as well, because parliamentary approval for several major investment projects has been held up due to the infighting. The lack of economic vibrancy led to strikes in several economic sectors in 2012.

On other regional issues, in part because of its leadership turmoil, Kuwait tends to defer to consensus positions within the Gulf Cooperation Council. This deference is evident in Kuwait’s stances on the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as on the uprisings in Yemen and Syria. Kuwait has largely confined its support for the armed rebellion in Syria to financial aid. On the uprising in Bahrain, in March 2011, Kuwait joined a Gulf Cooperation Council intervention on the side of the government, but unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Kuwait sent naval and not ground forces. .


Date of Report: July 10, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: RS21513
Price: $29.95

To Order:

RS21513.pdf   to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART

e-mail congress@pennyhill.com

Phone 301-253-0881

For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea

Investments made by Chinese companies in North Korea have increased dramatically over the past decade. Detailing the full extent of the People’s Republic of China's (PRC) investment in North Korea is difficult, as the North Korean government provides little information on the subject. While the government of the PRC publishes data regarding Chinese outward-bound foreign direct investment (FDI), it is unclear whether the official data provide a complete picture of the level of PRC investment in North Korea. However, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce, investments by Chinese companies have risen dramatically in recent years: the amount of investment reported for 2008 was $41.23 million U.S. dollars (USD), compared to only $1.2 million USD in 2003.

A substantial amount of this Chinese investment is taking place in the mining and mineral resource sectors of North Korea as well as in port facilities and other infrastructure sectors. A shift in investment strategy appears to have taken place around 2002, with the signing of a new investment agreement between the two governments and the creation of an experimental special economic zone for Chinese investors across the border from the Chinese city of Dandong. Although the two countries have announced a number of large-scale joint venture projects, there have been a number of obstacles and challenges preventing these investments from achieving their full potential.

Date of Report: July 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: G2262
Price: $9.95

To Order:

G2262.pdf   to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART

e-mail congress@pennyhill.com

Phone 301-253-0881

For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

  

Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces

As United States and Republic of Korea forces stand to defend against a DPRK attack, one of the most formidable tasks is how to counter a second front in the Joint Rear Security Area of the Republic of Korea. North Korea has a robust and diverse special operations force capability, their .Special Purpose Forces.. With nearly 104,000 soldiers committed to these daring tactics and operations, the United States and the Republic of Korea must be vigilant and innovative to protect their forces from such attacks. The principal mission of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces is to infiltrate into the enemies rear area and conduct short duration raids. Their most dangerous avenue of approach for their forces includes amphibious approaches, airborne infiltration and the use of a vast tunnel network. How would the North carry out such an attack against such formidable foes? Will they use special operation.s type forces to disrupt the South in their rear areas? How would they move their forces into South Korea? What solutions does the United States and the Republic of Korea have to solve this problem and which one is the best? This analysis examines the various methods the United States and the Republic of Korea will use to counter the North Korean Special Purpose Forces today and in the future.

Date of Report: July 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 54
Order Number: G2261
Price: $9.95

To Order:

G2261.pdf   to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART

e-mail congress@pennyhill.com

Phone 301-253-0881

For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.

Engagement of North Korea: Support for the “Sunshine Policy”

The North Korean nuclear weapons issue has culminated in a climactic standoff between the ill-equipped and undernourished nation and the rest of the world. Kim Jong Il has continued to defy the world community regarding missile testing and the desire to possess nuclear weapons. With North Korea becoming a confirmed nuclear power, the potential for radical instability in the Northeast Asian region exists to a greater degree than ever seen before in the post-Cold War era. The challenge for the United States and the world community is exactly how to handle this possibly disastrous turn of events. The Bush Administration policy of preemption when required, and the aggressive nature of its rhetoric regarding rogue states, may have caused North Korea to feel as if it may be the next battlefield enemy for the United States, and hence continue its missile and nuclear weapons testing. With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and continued operations in Iraq, it is imperative that the United States avoid another military crisis. A diplomatic solution must be seriously explored and would be in concert with American published strategic documents from the highest levels. Beginning a line of bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks will allow the United States to meet its strategic goals related to the GWOT that apply to the Korean peninsula, including the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat.


Date of Report: July 25, 2013
Number of Pages: 81
Order Number: G2259
Price: $9.95

To Order:

G2259.pdf   to use the SECURE SHOPPING CART

e-mail congress@pennyhill.com

Phone 301-253-0881

For email and phone orders, provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.