Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently. In his December 1, 2009, speech on policy in Afghanistan going forward, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on performance, and "The days of providing a blank check are over." The policy statement was based, in part, on an August 2009 assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, which warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic counterinsurgency strategy is employed. That counterinsurgency effort is deemed to require a legitimate and effective Afghan partner. 

The Afghan government's limited writ and widespread official corruption are identified by U.S. officials as factors helping sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai has been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition through compromise with faction leaders, but these political alliances have limited his ability to stock his government with politically neutral and technically competent officers. Despite the loss of confidence in Karzai, he went into the August 20, 2009, presidential election as the favorite. Amid widespread charges of fraud, many substantiated by a U.N.-backed Electoral Complaints Commission, nearly one-third of Karzai's votes were invalidated, leaving Karzai just short of the 50%+ total needed to avoid a second-round runoff. Asserting that more fraud was likely, Karzai's main challenger dropped out of the race on November 1, 2009, and Karzai was declared the winner. Karzai was inaugurated on November 19, with Secretary of State Clinton in attendance. On December 19, he presented a new cabinet to the National Assembly, retaining most of the better accomplished ministers but appointing allies of some faction leaders to several positions. Most of the highly regarded ministers were approved by the Assembly on January 2, 2010, but 17 of the 24 total nominees were voted down by parliamentarians. Karzai submitted a new list on January 9, 2010, and hopes to achieve approval of the empty posts before a major international conference on Afghanistan in Britain on January 28. As that meeting approaches, Karzai was challenged anew by international assertions that Afghan institutions will not be ready to hold credible parliamentary elections by May 22, 2010, a set by Afghan election authorities. Lacking funds and taking into account logistical and security difficulties, on January 24, 2010, this election date was postponed until September 18, 2010. 

Because most insurgents are, like Karzai, ethnic Pashtuns, stabilizing Afghanistan requires winning Pashtun political support for the Afghan government. This support requires effective local governing structures. The trend toward promoting local governing bodies has been accelerated by the Obama Administration and is likely to receive continued U.S. and partner country focus. Implementing this focus is a so-called "civilian uplift" that is in the process of doubling, to about 975 by early 2010, the number of U.S. civilian personnel helping build Afghan governing and security institutions and the economy. 

For further information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson. 

Date of Report: January 25, 2010
Number of Pages: 35
Order Number: RS21922
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