Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Summary
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration’s characterization of Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests,” a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran and by downplaying international sanctions on Iran, funding of civil society activists there,
and discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
The Administration’s Iran policy was not altered dramatically by the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009, presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. However, the unrest has represented the most serious challenge, to date, to the regime’s authority, and has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran’s government or to back the growing ranks of the domestic Iranian opposition. To date, the Administration has continued to back engagement with Iran, in part by attending an October 1, 2009, multilateral meeting with Iran and subsequently pursuing possible agreement with Iran for Russia and France to reprocess some of Iran’s low-enriched uranium for medical use. However, Iran has not, to date, agreed to the stipulated technical details of such a reprocessing program, casting doubts on Iran’s commitment to the tentative deal and sparking renewed discussions of more U.N. sanctions.
Any additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Some in Congress believe that additional unilateral U.S. sanctions—reflected in bills in the 111th Congress such as H.R. 2194, S. 908, and the “Dodd-Shelby Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act”—could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe new U.S. unilateral or U.N. sanctions would cause Iran to resist compromise and fracture
the U.S.-led coalition that is trying to curb Iran’s program. The Obama Administration and its partners have not withdrawn previous offers of economic and political incentives for Iran if it were to agree to a nuclear settlement acceptable to the international community. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
Date of Report: December 15, 2009
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RL32048
Price: $29.95
Document available electronically as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail congress@pennyhill.com or call us at 301-253-0881.
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Summary
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration’s characterization of Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests,” a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran and by downplaying international sanctions on Iran, funding of civil society activists there,
and discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
The Administration’s Iran policy was not altered dramatically by the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009, presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. However, the unrest has represented the most serious challenge, to date, to the regime’s authority, and has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran’s government or to back the growing ranks of the domestic Iranian opposition. To date, the Administration has continued to back engagement with Iran, in part by attending an October 1, 2009, multilateral meeting with Iran and subsequently pursuing possible agreement with Iran for Russia and France to reprocess some of Iran’s low-enriched uranium for medical use. However, Iran has not, to date, agreed to the stipulated technical details of such a reprocessing program, casting doubts on Iran’s commitment to the tentative deal and sparking renewed discussions of more U.N. sanctions.
Any additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Some in Congress believe that additional unilateral U.S. sanctions—reflected in bills in the 111th Congress such as H.R. 2194, S. 908, and the “Dodd-Shelby Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act”—could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe new U.S. unilateral or U.N. sanctions would cause Iran to resist compromise and fracture
the U.S.-led coalition that is trying to curb Iran’s program. The Obama Administration and its partners have not withdrawn previous offers of economic and political incentives for Iran if it were to agree to a nuclear settlement acceptable to the international community. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
Date of Report: December 15, 2009
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RL32048
Price: $29.95
Document available electronically as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail congress@pennyhill.com or call us at 301-253-0881.
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