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Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a steady increase in U.S. forces there in recent years. Signs of deterioration have included an expanded area in which militants are operating, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the ease of infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a “strategic review,” the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance. As part of that review, the President did announce an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops, which arrived by November 2009 and brought U.S. force levels to about 68,000, in partnership with about 39,000 international forces from 42 other nations, and about 190,000 Afghan security forces.

The Administration also decided that more innovative military tactics were needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was replaced by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. On August 30, 2009, McChrystal submitted his review of the military strategy, recommending a fully esourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy in order to avoid mission failure. He subsequently recommended that about 40,000 additional U.S. combat forces are needed to implement that strategy. A series of high level meetings to again review policy began September 30. President Obama announced, on December 1, 2009, the following:
• The provision of 30,000 additional U.S. forces to begin deploying by January 2010 to
  “reverse the Taliban’s momentum and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces
   and government so that they can take the lead.”
• A conditions-based plan to draw down U.S. forces beginning in July 2011.
• A call for additional partner contributions, with no specific figure mentioned.
U.S. strategy—which depends on the presence of a legitimate Afghan partner to implement—was complicated by the widespread fraud allegations in the ugust 20, 2009, presidential election. Following extensive investigation, President amid Karzai accepted a run-off vote with the second-place finisher, ormer Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, as required by the Afghan constitution. However, Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of the run-off and Karzai was eclared the winner of the presidency on November 2. He was inaugurated November 19 and presented to parliament a new cabinet on December 19. It retained about half the incumbents, including most of the widely praised economic sector ministers, but also included some new figures purportedly linked to traditional ethnic and olitical faction leaders.

Including FY2009, the United States has provided over $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $21 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. International donors have contributed over $35 billion in the similar time frame. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

Date of Report: December 30, 2009
Number of Pages: 90
Order Number: RL30588
Price: $29.95

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